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RESUMEN: Las nuevas tecnologías y en particular la Inteligencia 
Artificial están cambiando de forma importante la naturaleza 
del proceso creativo. Los ordenadores están jugando un papel 
muy significativo en actividades artísticas tales como la música, 
la arquitectura, las bellas artes y la ciencia. Efectivamente, el 
ordenador ya es el lienzo, el pincel, el instrumento musical, etc. 
Sin embargo creemos que debemos aspirar a relaciones más 
ambiciosas entre los ordenadores y la creatividad. En lugar de 
verlos solamente como herramientas de ayuda a la creación, 
los ordenadores podrían ser considerados agentes creativos. 
Este punto de vista ha dado lugar a un nuevo subcampo de la 
Inteligencia Artificial denominado Creatividad Computacional. 
En este artículo abordamos la cuestión de la posibilidad de de 
alcanzar dicha creatividad computacional mediante algunos 
ejemplos de programas de ordenador capaces de replicar algu-
nos aspectos relacionados con el comportamiento creativo en 
los ámbitos de la música y la ciencia.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Inteligencia Artificial, Creatividad Compu-
tacional.
ABSTRACT: New technologies, and in particular artificial intel-
ligence, are drastically changing the nature of creative proc-
esses. Computers are playing very significant roles in creative 
activities such as music, architecture, fine arts, and science. 
Indeed, the computer is already a canvas, a brush, a musical 
instrument, and so on. However, we believe that we must aim 
at more ambitious relations between computers and creativity. 
Rather than just seeing the computer as a tool to help human 
creators, we could see it as a creative entity in its own right. This 
view has triggered a new subfield of Artificial Intelligence called 
Computational Creativity. This article addresses the question 
of the possibility of achieving computational creativity through 
some examples of computer programs capable of replicating 
some aspects of creative behavior in the fields of music and 
science.
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INTRODUCTION
Computational creativity is the study of building 
software that exhibits behaviour that would be dee-
med creative in humans. Such creative software can 
be used for autonomous creative tasks, such as inven-
ting mathematical theories, writing poems, painting 
pictures, and composing music. However, computa-
tional creativity studies also enable us to understand 
human creativity and to produce programs for creati-
ve people to use, where the software acts as a creative 
collaborator rather than a mere tool. Historically, it’s 
been difficult for society to come to terms with machi-
nes that purport to be intelligent and even more diffi-
cult to admit that they might be creative. Even within 
computer science, people are still sceptical about the 
creative potential of software. A typical statement of 
detractors of computational creativity is that “simula-
ting artistic techniques means also simulating human 
thinking and reasoning, especially creative thinking. 
This is impossible to do using algorithms or informa-
tion processing systems.” We couldn’t disagree more. 
As is hopefully evident from the examples in this pa-
per, creativity is not some mystical gift that is beyond 
scientific study but rather something that can be in-
vestigated, simulated, and harnessed for the good of 
society. And while society might still be catching up, 
computational creativity as a discipline has come of 
age. This maturity is evident in the amount of activi-
ty related to computational creativity in recent years; 
in the sophistication of the creative software we are 
building; in the cultural value of the artefacts being 
produced by our software; and most importantly, in 
the consensus we are finding on general issues of 
computational creativity.
Computational creativity is a very lively subject 
area, with many issues still open to debate. For ins-
tance, many people still turn to the Turing test (Tu-
ring, 1950) to approximate the value of the artefacts 
produced by their software. That is, if a certain num-
ber of people cannot determine which artefacts were 
produced by computer and which were produced by a 
human, then the software is doing well. Other people 
believe that the Turing test is inappropriate for creati-
ve software. One has to ask the question, “Under full 
disclosure, would people value the artefacts produ-
ced by a computer as highly as they would the human 
produced ones?” In some domains, the answer could 
be yes: for instance, a joke is still funny whether or not 
it is produced by a computer. In other domains, such 
as the visual arts, however, the answer is very likely 
to be no. This highlights the fact that the production 
process, and not just the outcome of it, is taken into 
account when assessing artworks. Hence, one could 
argue that such Turing-style tests are essentially set-
ting the Computers up for a fall.
Creativity seems mysterious because when we have 
creative ideas it is very difficult to explain how we 
got them and we often talk about vague notions like 
“inspiration” and “intuition” when we try to explain 
creativity. The fact that we are not conscious of how 
a creative idea manifests itself does not necessarily 
imply that a scientific explanation cannot exist. As a 
matter of fact, we are not aware of how we perform 
other activities such as language understanding, pat-
tern recognition, and so on, but we have better and 
better AI techniques able to replicate such activities. 
Since nothing can arise from the emptiness, we 
must understand that every creative work or creative 
idea always is preceded by a historical - cultural sche-
me, it is a fruit of the cultural inheritance and the lived 
experiences. As Margaret Boden states in her book Ar-
tificial Intelligence and Natural Man: 
“Probably the new thoughts that originate in the mind 
are not completely new, because have their seeds in 
representations that already are in the mind. To put it 
differently, the germ of our culture, all our knowled-
ge and our experience, is behind each creative idea. 
The greater the knowledge and the experience, the 
greater the possibility of finding an unthinkable rela-
tion that leads to a creative idea. If we understand 
creativity like the result of establishing new relations 
between pieces of knowledge that we already have, 
then the more previous knowledge one has the more 
capacity to be creative”. 
With this understanding in mind, an operational, 
and widely accepted, definition of creativity is: “a 
creative idea is a novel and valuable combination of 
known ideas”. In other words, physical laws, theo-
rems, musical pieces can be generated from a finite 
set of existing elements and, therefore, creativity is an 
advanced form of problem solving that involves me-
mory, analogy, learning, and reasoning under constra-
ints, among other things, and is therefore possible to 
replicate by means of computers. 
This article addresses the question of the possibility 
of achieving computational creativity through some 
examples of computer programs capable of replica-
ting some aspects of creative behaviour in the fields 
of music and science. We did not intend to cover the 
full range of AI approaches to computational creativi-
ty and we could not include the many existing areas 
of application. 
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For further reading regarding computational crea-
tivity in general, I recommend the books by Boden 
(1991, 1994, 2009), Dartnall (1994), Partridge and 
Rowe (1994), and Bentley and Corne (2002); as well 
as the papers by Rowe and Partridge (1993), Bucha-
nan (2001) and the recent special issue of AI Maga-
zine edited by Colton, López de Mántaras and Stock 
(2009).
COMPUTATIONAL CREATIVITY IN MUSIC
Artificial Intelligence has played a crucial role in 
the history of computer music almost since its begin-
nings in the 1950s. However, until quite recently, most 
effort had been on compositional and improvisational 
systems and little efforts had been devoted to expres-
sive performance. In this section we review a selec-
tion of some significant achievements in AI appro-
aches to music composition, music performance, and 
improvisation, with an emphasis on the synthesis of 
expressive music.
Composing music
Hiller and Isaacson (1958) work, on the ILLIAC com-
puter, is the best known pioneering work in compu-
ter music. Their chief result is the Illiac Suite, a string 
quartet composed following the “generate and test” 
problem solving approach. The program generated 
notes pseudo-randomly by means of Markov chains. 
The generated notes were next tested by means of 
heuristic compositional rules of classical harmony 
and counterpoint. Only the notes satisfying the rules 
were kept. If none of the generated notes satisfied 
the rules, a simple backtracking procedure was used 
to erase the entire composition up to that point, and 
a new cycle was started again. The goals of Hiller and 
Isaacson excluded anything related to expressiveness 
and emotional content. In an interview (Schwanauer 
and Levitt, 1993, p. 21), Hiller and Isaacson said that, 
before addressing the expressiveness issue, simpler 
problems needed to be handled first. We believe that 
this was a very correct observation in the fifties. Af-
ter this seminal work, many other researchers based 
their computer compositions on Markov probability 
transitions but also with rather limited success jud-
ging from the standpoint of melodic quality. Indeed, 
methods relying too heavily on markovian processes 
are not informed enough to produce high quality mu-
sic consistently.
However, not all the early work on composition re-
lies on probabilistic approaches. A good example is the 
work of Moorer (1972) on tonal melody generation. 
Moorer’s program generated simple melodies, along 
with the underlying harmonic progressions, with sim-
ple internal repetition patterns of notes. This appro-
ach relies on simulating human composition processes 
using heuristic techniques rather than on Markovian 
probability chains. Levitt (1983) also avoided the use 
of probabilities in the composition process. He argues 
that: “randomness tends to obscure rather than reveal 
the musical constraints needed to represent simple 
musical structures”. His work is based on constraint-
based descriptions of musical styles. He developed a 
description language that allows musically meaningful 
transformations of inputs, such as chord progressions 
and melodic lines, to be expressed through a series of 
constraint relationships that he calls “style templates”. 
He applied this approach to describe a traditional jazz 
walking bass player simulation as well as a two-handed 
ragtime piano simulation.
The early systems by Hiller-Isaacson and Moorer 
were both based also on heuristic approaches. Howe-
ver, possibly the most genuine example of early use 
of AI techniques is the work of Rader (1974). Rader 
used rule-based AI programming in his musical round 
(a circle canon such as Frère Jacques) generator. The 
generation of the melody and the harmony were ba-
sed on rules describing how notes or chords may be 
put together. The most interesting AI component of 
this system are the applicability rules, determining 
the applicability of the melody and chord generation 
rules, and the weighting rules indicating the likeliho-
od of application of an applicable rule by means of a 
weight. We can already appreciate the use of metak-
nowledge in this early work.
AI pioneers such as Herbert Simon or Marvin Mins-
ky also published works relevant to computer music. 
Simon and Sumner (1968) describe a formal pattern 
language for music, as well as a pattern induction 
method, to discover patterns more or less implicit 
in musical works. One example of pattern that can 
be discovered is “the opening section is in C Major, 
it is followed by a section in dominant and then a re-
turn to the original key”. Although the program was 
not completed, it is worth noticing that it was one of 
the firsts in dealing with the important issue of music 
modelling, a subject that has been, and still is, widely 
studied. For example, the use of models based on ge-
nerative grammars has been, and continues to be, an 
important and very useful approach in music mode-
lling (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983).
Marvin Minsky, in his well known paper “Music, 
Mind, and Meaning” (Minsky, 1981), addresses the 
𝖃𝖐𝕾Ꮩ⊔⊂⊃ ∀
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important question of “how music impresses our 
minds”. He applies his concepts of agent and its role in 
a society of agents as a possible approach to shed light 
on that question. For example, he hints that one agent 
might do nothing more than noticing that the music 
has a particular rhythm. Other agents might perceive 
small musical patterns such as repetitions of a pitch; 
differences such as the same sequence of notes pla-
yed one fifth higher, etc. His approach also accounts 
for more complex relations within a musical piece by 
means of higher order agents capable of recognizing 
large sections of music. It is important to clarify that in 
that paper Minsky does not try to convince the reader 
about the question of the validity of his approach, he 
just hints at its plausibility.
Among the compositional systems there is a large 
number dealing with the problem of automatic har-
monization using several AI techniques. One of the 
earliest works is that of Rothgeb (1969). He wrote a 
SNOBOL program to solve the problem of harmonizing 
the unfigured bass (given a sequence of bass notes 
infer the chords and voice leadings that accompany 
those bass notes) by means of a set of rules such as “If 
the bass of a triad descends a semitone, then the next 
bass note has a sixth”. The main goal of Rothgeb was 
not the automatic harmonization itself but to test the 
computational soundness of two bass harmonization 
theories from the eighteenth century.
One of the most complete works on harmonization 
is that of Ebcioglu (1993). He developed an expert sys-
tem, CHORAL, to harmonize chorales in the style of 
J.S. Bach. CHORAL is given a melody and produces the 
corresponding harmonization using heuristic rules and 
constraints. The system was implemented using a logic 
programming language designed by the author. An im-
portant aspect of this work is the use of sets of logical 
primitives to represent the different viewpoints of the 
music (chords view, time-slice view, melodic view, etc.). 
This was done to tackle the problem of representing 
large amounts of complex musical knowledge.
MUSACT (Bharucha, 1993) uses Neural Networks to 
learn a model of musical harmony. It was designed to 
capture musical intuitions of harmonic qualities. For 
example, one of the qualities of a dominant chord is 
to create in the listener the expectancy that the tonic 
chord is about to be heard. The greater the expectan-
cy, the greater the feeling of consonance of the tonic 
chord. Composers may choose to satisfy or violate 
these expectancies to varying degree. MUSACT is ca-
pable of learning such qualities and generate graded 
expectancies in a given harmonic context.
In HARMONET (Feulner, 1993), the harmonization 
problem is approached using a combination of neural 
networks and constraint satisfaction techniques. The 
neural network learns what is known as the harmo-
nic functionality of the chords (chords can play the 
function of tonic, dominant, subdominant, etc) and 
constraints are used to fill the inner voices of the 
chords. The work on HARMONET was extended in 
the MELONET system (Hörnel and Degenhardt, 1997; 
Hörnel and Menzael, 1998). MELONET uses a neural 
network to learn and reproduce higher-level structure 
in melodic sequences. Given a melody, the system in-
vents a baroque-style harmonization and variation of 
any chorale voice. According to the authors, HARMO-
NET and MELONET together form a powerful music-
composition system that generates variations whose 
quality is similar to those of an experienced human 
organist.
Pachet and Roy (1998) also used constraint satis-
faction techniques for harmonization. These techni-
ques exploit the fact that both the melody and the 
harmonization knowledge impose constraints on the 
possible chords. Efficiency is, however, a problem with 
purely constraint satisfaction approaches. 
In (Sabater et al., 1998), the problem of harmo-
nization is approached using a combination of rules 
and case-based reasoning. This approach is based on 
the observation that purely rule-based harmoniza-
tion usually fails because, in general, “the rules don’t 
make the music, it is the music that makes the rules”. 
Then, instead of relying only on a set of imperfect ru-
les, why not making use of the source of the rules, 
that is the compositions themselves? Case-based rea-
soning allows the use of examples of already harmo-
nized compositions as cases for new harmonizations. 
The system harmonizes a given melody by first looking 
for similar, already harmonized, cases, when this fails, 
it looks for applicable general rules of harmony. If no 
rule is applicable, the system fails and backtracks to 
the previous decision point. The experiments have 
shown that the combination of rules and cases re-
sults in much fewer failures in finding an appropria-
te harmonization than using either technique alone. 
Another advantage of the case-based approach is that 
each newly correctly harmonized piece can be memo-
rized and made available as a new example to harmo-
nize other melodies; that is, a learning-by-experience 
process takes place. Indeed, the more examples the 
system has, the less often the system needs to resort 
to the rules and therefore it fails less. MUSE (Schwa-
nauer, 1993) is also a learning system that extends 
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an initially small set of voice leading constraints by 
learning a set of rules of voice doubling and voice lea-
ding. It learns by reordering the rules agenda and by 
chunking the rules that satisfy the set of voice leading 
constraints. MUSE successfully learned some of the 
standard rules of voice leading included in traditional 
books of tonal music.
Morales-Manzanares et al. (2001) developed a sys-
tem called SICIB capable of composing music using 
body movements. This system uses data from sensors 
attached to the dancer and applies inference rules to 
couple the gestures with the music in real time.
Certainly the best-known work on computer com-
position using AI is David Cope’s EMI project (Cope, 
1987, 1990). This work focuses on the emulation of 
styles of various composers. It has successfully com-
posed music in the styles of Cope, Mozart, Palestri-
na, Albinoni, Brahms, Debussy, Bach, Rachmaninoff, 
Chopin, Stravinsky, and Bartok. It works by searching 
for recurrent patterns in several (at least two) wor-
ks of a given composer. The discovered patterns are 
called signatures. Since signatures are location de-
pendent, EMI uses one of the composer’s works as a 
guide to fix them to their appropriate locations when 
composing a new piece. To compose the musical mo-
tives between signatures, EMI uses a compositional 
rule analyzer to discover the constraints used by the 
composer in his works. This analyzer counts musical 
events such as voice leading directions; use of repea-
ted notes, etc. and represents them as a statistical 
model of the analyzed works. The program follows 
this model to compose the motives to be inserted in 
the empty spaces between signatures. To properly 
insert them, EMI has to deal with problems such as: 
linking initial and concluding parts of the signatures to 
the surrounding motives avoiding stylistic anomalies, 
maintaining voice motions, maintaining notes within 
a range, etc. Proper insertion is achieved by means 
of an Augmented Transition Network (Woods, 1970). 
The results, although not perfect, are quite consistent 
with the style of the composer.
Synthesizing expressive music
One of the main limitations of computer-generated 
music has been its lack of expressiveness, that is, lack 
of “gesture”. Gesture is what musicians call the nuan-
ces of performance that are uniquely and subtly inter-
pretive or, in other words, creative. 
One of the first attempts to address expressiveness 
in music is that of Johnson (1992). She developed an 
expert system to determine the tempo and the articu-
lation to be applied when playing Bach’s fugues from 
The Well-Tempered Clavier. The rules were obtained 
from two expert human performers. The output gi-
ves the base tempo value and a list of performance 
instructions on note duration and articulation that 
should be followed by a human player. The results 
very much coincide with the instructions given in well 
known commented editions of The Well-Tempered 
Clavier. The main limitation of this system is its lack 
of generality because it only works well for fugues 
written on a 4/4 meter. For different meters, the rules 
would be different. Another obvious consequence of 
this lack of generality is that the rules are only appli-
cable to Bach fugues.
The work of the KTH group from Stockholm (Friberg, 
1995; Friberg et al., 1998, 2000; Bresin, 2001) is one 
of the best-known long-term efforts on performance 
systems. Their current Director Musices system incor-
porates rules for tempo, dynamic, and articulation 
transformations constrained to MIDI. These rules are 
inferred both from theoretical musical knowledge and 
experimentally by training, specially using the so-ca-
lled analysis-by-synthesis approach. The rules are divi-
ded in three main classes: Differentiation rules, which 
enhance the differences between scale tones; Grou-
ping rules, which show what tones belong together; 
and Ensemble rules, that synchronize the various voi-
ces in an ensemble.
Canazza et al. (1997) developed a system to analyze 
how the musician’s expressive intentions are reflected 
in the performance. The analysis reveals two different 
expressive dimensions: one related to the energy 
(dynamics) and the other one related to the kinetics 
(rubato) of the piece. The authors also developed a 
program for generating expressive performances ac-
cording to these two dimensions.
The work of Dannenberg and Derenyi (1998) is also 
a good example of articulation transformations using 
manually constructed rules. They developed a trum-
pet synthesizer that combines a physical model with 
a performance model. The goal of the performance 
model is to generate control information for the phy-
sical model by means of a collection of rules manually 
extracted from the analysis of a collection of contro-
lled recordings of human performance.
Another approach taken for performing tempo and 
dynamics transformation is the use of neural network 
techniques. In Bresin (1998), a system that combines 
symbolic decision rules with neural networks is im-
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plemented for simulating the style of real piano per-
formers. The outputs of the neural networks express 
time and loudness deviations. These neural networks 
extend the standard feed-forward network trained 
with the back propagation algorithm with feedback 
connections from the output neurons to the input 
neurons.
We can see that, except for the work of the KTH 
group that considers three expressive resources, the 
other systems are limited to two resources such as 
rubato and dynamics, or rubato and articulation. This 
limitation has to do with the use of rules. Indeed, the 
main problem with the rule-based approaches is that 
it is very difficult to find rules general enough to cap-
ture the variety present in different performances of 
the same piece by the same musician and even the 
variety within a single performance (Kendall and Car-
terette, 1990). Furthermore, the different expressive 
resources interact with each other. That is, the rules 
for dynamics alone change when rubato is also taken 
into account. Obviously, due to this interdependency, 
the more expressive resources one tries to model, the 
more difficult it is to find the appropriate rules.
We developed a system called SaxEx (Arcos et al., 
1998), a computer program capable of synthesizing 
high quality expressive tenor sax solo performances 
of jazz ballads based on cases representing human 
solo performances. As mentioned above, previous 
rule-based approaches to that problem could not deal 
with more than two expressive parameters (such as 
dynamics and rubato) because it is too difficult to find 
rules general enough to capture the variety present 
in expressive performances. Besides, the different ex-
pressive parameters interact with each other making 
it even more difficult to find appropriate rules taking 
into account these interactions. 
With CBR, we have shown that it is possible to deal 
with the five most important expressive parameters: 
dynamics, rubato, vibrato, articulation, and attack of 
the notes. To do so, SaxEx uses a case memory con-
taining examples of human performances, analyzed 
by means of spectral modeling techniques and back-
ground musical knowledge. The score of the piece to 
be performed is also provided to the system. The core 
of the method is to analyze each input note determi-
ning (by means of the background musical knowled-
ge) its role in the musical phrase it belongs to, identify 
and retrieve (from the case-base of human perfor-
mances) notes with similar roles, and finally, trans-
form the input note so that its expressive properties 
(dynamics, rubato, vibrato, articulation, and attack) 
match those of the most similar retrieved note. Each 
note in the case base is annotated with its role in 
the musical phrase it belongs to, as well as with its 
expressive values. Furthermore, cases do not contain 
just information on each single note but they include 
contextual knowledge at the phrase level. Therefore, 
cases in this system have a complex object-centered 
representation. 
Although limited to monophonic performances, 
the results are very convincing and demonstrate that 
CBR is a very powerful methodology to directly use 
the knowledge of a human performer that is implicit 
in her playing examples rather than trying to make 
this knowledge explicit by means of rules. Some au-
dio results can be listened at http://www.iiia.csic.
es/%7Earcos/noos/Demos/Example.html. More re-
cent papers (Arcos and López de Mántaras, 2001; Ló-
pez de Mántaras and Arcos, 2002), describe this sys-
tem in great detail.
Based on the work on SaxEx, we developed Tem-
poExpress (Grachten et al. 2004), a case-based reaso-
ning system for applying musically acceptable tempo 
transformations to monophonic audio recordings of 
musical performances. TempoExpress has a rich des-
cription of the musical expressivity of the performan-
ces, that includes not only timing deviations of perfor-
med score notes, but also represents more rigorous 
kinds of expressivity such as note ornamentation, 
consolidation, and fragmentation. Within the tempo 
transformation process, the expressivity of the perfor-
mance is adjusted in such a way that the result sounds 
natural for the new tempo. A case base of previously 
performed melodies is used to infer the appropriate 
expressivity. The problem of changing the tempo of 
a musical performance is not as trivial as it may seem 
because it involves a lot of musical knowledge and 
creative thinking. Indeed, when a musician performs 
a musical piece at different tempos the performances 
are not just time-scaled versions of each other (as if 
the same performance were played back at different 
speeds). Together with the changes of tempo, varia-
tions in musical expression are made (Desain and 
Honing, 1993). Such variations do not only affect the 
timing of the notes, but can also involve for example 
the addition or deletion of ornamentations, or the 
consolidation/fragmentation of notes. Apart from the 
tempo, other domain specific factors seem to play an 
important role in the way a melody is performed, such 
as meter, and phrase structure. Tempo transformation 
is one of the audio post-processing tasks manually 
done in audio-labs. Automatizing this process may, 
therefore, be of industrial interest.
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Other applications of CBR to expressive music are 
those of Suzuki et al. (1999), and those of Tobudic 
and Widmer (2003, 2004). Suzuki et al. (1999), use 
examples cases of expressive performances to ge-
nerate multiple performances of a given piece with 
varying musical expression, however they deal only 
with two expressive parameters. Tobudic and Widmer 
(2003) apply instance-based learning (IBL) also to the 
problem of generating expressive performances. The 
IBL approach is used to complement a note-level rule-
based model with some predictive capability at the 
higher level of musical phrasing. More concretely, the 
IBL component recognizes performance patterns, of a 
concert pianist, at the phrase level and learns how to 
apply them to new pieces by analogy. The approach 
produced some interesting results but, as the authors 
recognize, was not very convincing due to the limita-
tion of using an attribute-value representation for the 
phrases. Such simple representation cannot take into 
account relevant structural information of the piece, 
both at the sub-phrase level and at the inter-phrasal 
level. In a subsequent paper, Tobudic and Widmer 
(2004), succeeded in partly overcoming this limita-
tions by using a relational phrase representation. 
Widmer et al. (2009) describe a computer program 
that learns to expressively perform classical piano 
music. The approach is data intensive and based on 
statistical learning. Performing music expressively cer-
tainly requires high levels of creativity, but the authors 
take a very pragmatic view to the question of whether 
their program can be said to be creative or not and 
claim that “creativity is in the eye of the beholder.” In 
fact, the main goal of the authors is to investigate and 
better understand music performance as a creative 
human behaviour by means of AI methods. 
The possibility for a computer to play expressively 
is a fundamental component of the so-called hyper-
instruments. These are instruments designed to aug-
ment an instrument sound with such idiosyncratic 
nuances as to give it human expressiveness and a 
rich, live sound. To make an hyper-instrument, take 
a traditional instrument, like for example a cello, and 
connect it to a computer through electronic sensors in 
the neck and in the bow, equip also with sensors the 
hand that holds the bow and program the computer 
with a system similar to SaxEx that allows to analyse 
the way the human interprets the piece, based on the 
score, on musical knowledge and on the readings of 
the sensors. The results of this analysis allow the hy-
per-instrument to play an active role altering aspects 
such as timbre, tone, rhythm and phrasing as well as 
generating an accompanying voice. In other words, 
you get an instrument that can be its own intelligent 
accompanist. Tod Machover, from MIT’s Media Lab, 
developed such an hyper cello and the great cello pla-
yer Yo-Yo Ma premiered, playing the hyper cello, a pie-
ce, composed by Tod Machover, called “Begin Again 
Again...” at the Tanglewood Festival several years ago.
Improvising music
Music improvisation is a very complex creative pro-
cess that has also been computationally modelled. It 
is often referred to as “composition on the fly” and, 
therefore, it is, creatively speaking, more complex 
than composition and it is probably the most com-
plex of the three music activities surveyed here. An 
early work on computer improvisation is the Flavours 
Band system of Fry (1984). Flavours Band is a proce-
dural language, embedded in LISP, for specifying jazz 
and popular music styles. Its procedural representa-
tion allows the generation of scores in a pre-specified 
style by making changes to a score specification given 
as input. It allows combining random functions and 
musical constraints (chords, modes, etc.) to genera-
te improvisational variations. The most remarkable 
result of Flavours Band was an interesting arrange-
ment of the bass line, and an improvised solo, of John 
Coltrane’s composition “Giant Steps”.
GenJam (1994) builds a model of a jazz musician 
learning to improvise by means of a genetic algorithm. 
A human listener plays the role of fitness function by 
rating the offspring improvisations. Papadopoulos 
and Wiggins (1998) also used a genetic algorithm to 
improvise jazz melodies on a given chord progression. 
Contrarily to GenJam, the program includes a fitness 
function that automatically evaluates the quality of 
the offspring improvisations rating eight different as-
pects of the improvised melody such as the melodic 
contour, notes duration, intervallic distances between 
notes, etc.
Franklin (2001) uses recurrent neural networks to 
learn how to improvise jazz solos from transcriptions 
of solo improvisations by saxophonist Sonny Rollins. A 
reinforcement learning algorithm is used to refine the 
behaviour of the neural network. The reward function 
rates the system solos in terms of jazz harmony crite-
ria and according to Rollins style.
The lack of interactivity, with a human improviser, 
of the above approaches has been criticized (Thom, 
2001) on the grounds that they remove the musician 
from the physical and spontaneous creation of a me-
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lody. Although it is true that the most fundamental 
characteristic of improvisation is the spontaneous, 
real-time creation of a melody, it is also true that in-
teractivity was not intended in these approaches and 
nevertheless they could generate very interesting 
improvisations. Thom (2001) with her Band-out-of-a-
Box (BoB) system addresses the problem of real-time 
interactive improvisation between BoB and a human 
player. In other words, BoB is a “music companion” 
for real-time improvisation. Thom’s approach follows 
Johnson-Laird’s (1991) psychological theory of jazz 
improvisation. This theory opposes the view that im-
provising consists of rearranging and transforming 
pre-memorized “licks” under the constraints of a har-
mony. Instead he proposes a stochastic model based 
on a greedy search over a constrained space of possi-
ble notes to play at a given point in time. The very im-
portant contribution Thom makes is that her system 
learns these constraints, and therefore the stochastic 
model, from the human player by means of an unsu-
pervised probabilistic clustering algorithm. The lear-
ned model is used to abstract solos into user-specific 
playing modes. The parameters of that learned model 
are then incorporated into a stochastic process that 
generates the solos in response to four bar solos of 
the human improviser. BoB has been very successfully 
evaluated by testing its real-time solo tradings in two 
different styles, that of saxophonist Charlie Parker, 
and that of violinist Stephane Grapelli.
Another remarkable interactive improvisation sys-
tem was developed by Dannenberg (1993). The diffe-
rence with Thom’s approach is that in Dannenberg’s 
system, music generation is mainly driven by the 
composer’s goals rather than the performer’s goals. 
Wessel’s (1998) interactive improvisation system is 
closer to Thom’s in that it also emphasizes the accom-
paniment and enhancement of live improvisations.
COMPUTATIONAL CREATIVITY IN SCIENCE
BACON (Langley et al., 1987) is a representative 
example of a program capable of rediscovering im-
portant scientific laws using the “generate and test” 
mechanism. BACON takes as inputs non-interpreted 
numerical data and, when successful, produces scien-
tific laws that fit the data. Before proceeding with BA-
CON operational details, it is important to notice that 
the fact that it “rediscovers” known laws does not 
preclude its interest as a computational model of a 
creative process since, in principle, there is no reason 
to believe that the cognitive processes involved in a 
genuine discovery are different from those involved 
in a rediscovery.
The discovery process of BACON is not a random 
one and it could not be because the space of possible 
functions to try is not finite and even if the search were 
limited to a finite subset, any useful scientific domain 
would be too large to allow random search. BACON 
uses several heuristics for searching selectively. First, 
starts with simple functions (as the linear function), 
then proceeds with more complex ones that are for-
med by multiplying or dividing pairs of functions. Se-
cond, BACON uses data to guide the selection of the 
next function to try. More precisely, it notices if one 
variable increases or decreases monotonically with 
respect to another. If it increases, it will test whether 
the ratios of the values of the variables are constant. 
If it decreases, it will test whether the products are 
constant. The main point is that BACON selects the 
next function to test depending on how previously 
tried functions fit the data. Third, in situations in-
volving more than two variables, BACON follows the 
well-known experimental procedure of changing one 
independent variable at a time. Having found condi-
tional dependencies among small sets of variables, it 
explores the effects of altering other variables.
With these simple means, and supplied with the 
actual data used by the original discoverers, BACON 
rediscovered Kepler’s Third Law of planetary motion, 
Ohm’s Law of electric current and resistance, Black’s 
Law of temperature equilibrium for mixtures of li-
quids and many others.
In validating BACON as a theory of human discovery, 
Herbert Simon pointed out that BACON, interestingly 
enough, initially arrived at the same erroneous square 
law that Kepler himself had initially formulated, that 
is “the period of revolution of the planets varied as 
the square of their distance to the Sun”. However, 
BACON rejected it because it did not fit the data well 
enough, and went on to discover the correct law. If 
BACON had used a larger error tolerance parameter it 
would have also made Kepler’s mistake. According to 
Simon “BACON shows that theories of inspiration are 
constructed and tested in exactly the same manner 
as other scientific theories”, that is, scientists need 
not to be “seized by god” to discover new laws. This 
is true; Simon proceeds, even in discovering new con-
cepts as BACON also shows. Indeed, using the heu-
ristic that when it discovers that there is an invariant 
relation in the interaction between two or more ele-
ments in a situation, it should assign a new property 
to the elements, and measure its magnitude by the 
relative strength of each element’s action, BACON re-
discovered the concept of inertial mass after noticing 
ARBOR Vol. 189-764, noviembre-diciembre 2013, a082. ISSN-L: 0210-1963 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2013.764n6005
Ram
on López de M
ántaras Badia
9
a082
that when pairs of bodies collide, the ratio of accele-
rations of any given pair is always the same. To do so, 
according to Simon, BACON defined a new property 
“P” and assigned a value 1 to that property for body 
A and a value inversely proportional to the magnitude 
of their accelerations in collisions with A to the other 
bodies. This procedure turns out to be a quite general 
heuristic for discovering new concepts and has been 
used by BACON in discovering the concepts of specific 
heat, refractive index, voltage, molecular weight and 
atomic weight among others. Again, inspiration turns 
out to be a by-product of ordinary heuristic search in 
Simon’s saying.
In my opinion, Simon was too optimistic. BACON 
is too inflexible to be an acceptable computational 
model of scientific discovery. Indeed, its behaviour is 
completely determined by its fixed set of heuristics 
that guide an ad-hoc process of function approxima-
tion. There is no flexibility in the representation. To 
improve this, other programs such as GLAUBER (Lan-
gley et al., 1987) were written. These programs are 
able to induce structural and explanatory models of 
certain phenomena. In particular GLAUBER examines 
qualitative data and produces classifications that in-
duce general laws. For example, given a series of re-
sults of chemistry experiments such as:
(reacts input (C1H, NaOH) output (NaCl)) 
GLAUBER induces the law:
(reacts input (acid, alkali) output (salt))
Another well known scientific discoverer is the Au-
tomated Mathematician or AM (Lenat, 1983), a pro-
gram that (re)discovered mathematical concepts in 
number theory based on a hierarchy of about 100 
basic concepts (sets, ordered pairs, basic operations 
such as union, intersection, etc.) and using some 250 
heuristic rules to guide the discovery process. Each 
concept is represented by a set of slots containing 
information such as definition, examples, specializa-
tions, worth, and in the case of operations its domain 
and range. The heuristic rules are of four different ty-
pes: Fill, check, suggest and interest. Thus AM can use 
interest rules to evaluate the interest of the concepts 
it discovers and, therefore, guide the search towards 
more promising concepts. Fill rules try to fill the exam-
ples slot with examples of a concept. Check rules verify 
correctness of the examples and also look for regulari-
ties. Suggest rules are considered when the program 
is running low on interesting things to do. Overall, AM 
is controlled by an agenda which maintains a list of 
tasks sorted according to the interest of the concepts 
involved, the number of reasons for suggesting the 
task and their worth and also the type of task. The top 
task is chosen relevant rules are gathered and applied 
resulting possibly in new concepts and new tasks.
AM rediscovered natural numbers, addition, mul-
tiplication, prime numbers, the prime factorization 
theorem and the, yet unproven, Goldbach’s conjectu-
re (any even number greater than two is the sum of 
two different primes) but soon reached its limits and 
failed to produce other interesting concepts. Instead 
it proposed many boring tasks. According to Lenat, 
such early limitation was due to the fixed nature of 
the heuristics that worked well with simple concepts 
such as sets but did not work with higher-level con-
cepts such as numbers. With the aim of overcoming 
this limitation, he extended AM to automatically mo-
dify its heuristic rules. The result was very disappoin-
ting since a large number of useless rules were crea-
ted. According to Lenat (Rowe and Partridge, 1993), 
the reason was that many heuristics generated new 
concepts by syntactic manipulation of void concepts. 
When these were definitions of mathematical con-
cepts they were implemented as pieces of Lisp code 
and a minor modification to this Lisp code usually pro-
duced meaningful results. However, when similar mo-
difications were made to the Lisp code representing 
a heuristic rule, the results were meaningless. This 
is because heuristics operate at a much higher level 
than Lisp and many lines of Lisp code are required to 
implement each heuristic. Lenat, therefore, decided 
that a new representation language at a higher level 
than Lisp was needed and he developed EURISKO 
(Lenat, 1983) in which heuristics were represented 
as frames with slots containing small pieces of Lisp 
code. The idea was to produce meaningful changes in 
the heuristics by mutations in the values of the slots. 
EURISKO was applied to VLSI design, space-ship fleet 
design and number theory and it worked quite well 
when interacting with a user that could eliminate ob-
viously bad heuristics. However it did not go further 
than AM in number theory. It seems that, once more, 
the heuristics were not good enough. Going further 
in number theory requires dealing with concepts in 
many other mathematical domains such as algebra, 
geometry, graph theory, etc. and neither AM nor EU-
RISKO could deal with such concepts.
Besides, AM has been criticized by Ritchie and Han-
na (1984) on other grounds. According to Ritchie and 
Hanna, many rules contain “special purpose hacks”, 
never described by Lenat, that seem to have been 
written for the specific purpose of making the most 
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interesting “discoveries”. The precise extent of AM 
creativity is, therefore, rather unclear.
The major limitation of all these programs is that 
what to look for is built into the heuristics and that 
such heuristics are too inflexible. A creative idea also 
involves “breaking rules” or dropping constraints, and 
a mechanism to do so is that of reasoning by analogy. 
An excellent example of a human discovery, based on 
analogy and constraints dropping, is that of Kekule’s 
discovery of the benzene-ring structure (other well 
known examples of constraint dropping are non-
Euclidean geometry and Schoenberg’s non tonal mu-
sic). Kekule described his discovery as follows (Boden, 
1991):
“I turned the chair to the fire and dozed. Again the 
atoms were gamboling before my eyes... (My mental 
eye) could distinguish larger structures, of manifold 
conformation; long rows, sometimes more closely 
fitted together; all twining and twisting in snakelike 
motion. But look! What was that? One of the snakes 
had seized hold of its own tail, and the form whirled 
mockingly before my eyes. As if by a flash of lightning 
I awoke.”
This vision was the origin of his discovery that the 
benzene molecule was a ring and not a chain. The 
analogy between snakes and molecules was certainly 
a fundamental aspect of the discovery that triggered 
the dropping of the constraint that molecules should 
be chains (open curves) and allowing them to be clo-
sed curves (rings).
Psychologists have studied analogy for a long time 
and one of the main conclusions was that analogy is 
context-sensitive. Indeed, analogy in the context of 
poetry is not the same as in the context of science. 
COPYCAT (Mitchell and Hofstadter, 1990) was the first 
computational model of analogy and is heavily based 
on human psychology and particularly on context sen-
sitivity. This system generates many candidate analo-
gies but only those that are contextually appropria-
te are kept. COPYCAT constructs analogies between 
strings of letters. Let us see an example taken from 
Boden (1994). COPYCAT is given as input that the 
string abc rewrites into abd, and then is asked what 
the string mrrjjj will rewrite into. There are several 
acceptable answers to this depending on the context 
that COPYCAT has considered. For instance, if the con-
text favours “successors” over “repetitions”, then one 
answer would be mrrjjk. But if it favours repetitions 
then the answer is mrrjjjj. Another interesting analogy 
(Boden, 1994) found by COPYCAT is the following one: 
If abc rewrites into abd, what will xyz rewrite into? 
One very creative answer of COPYCAT was wyz. This 
answer involves simultaneously relating “left” with 
“right”, “first letter of the alphabet” with “last letter of 
the alphabet”, and “successor” with “predecessor”. In 
spite of operating in a very limited domain, COPYCAT 
shows interesting features of creative processing.
Other programs such as MECHEM (Valdés-Pérez, 
1995) incorporate sophisticated techniques of reaso-
ning by analogy and constraint satisfaction that allow 
them to reason about the structural transformations 
that take place in chemically reacting molecules with 
the aim of eliciting the internal, non observable, me-
chanisms involved in the reactions based on empirical 
evidence. MECHEM has discovered and explained me-
chanisms in the hydrogenolosis of methane that coin-
cide fully with results published just a couple of years 
earlier in the Journal “Catalysis Today”. Understanding 
the internal mechanisms involved in chemical reac-
tions has an enormous practical interest since that 
knowledge can suggest better ways of controlling the 
reactions. It has been conjectured that programs like 
MECHEM may well be necessary to understand the 
mechanisms implicit in complex chemical reactions.
Bob Holmes (1996) reported the development of 
a “Creativity Machine” developed by the materials 
scientist Steve Thaler. Among other applications, it 
discovered ultra-hard materials. This system is based 
on a large network with inputs and outputs repre-
senting every possible quantum state for every elec-
tron in every atom of a molecule. Thaler trained this 
network by showing it about 200 examples of two-
element molecules, such as water and iron oxide, 
to teach it plausible combinations and proportions. 
Holmes reports that the machine correctly identified 
known ultra-hard materials such as boron nitride and 
boron carbide, even though it had never seen these 
during training. It also proposed a material, C3N4 
that a group of theoreticians from Harvard had al-
most simultaneously suggested as a likely ultra-hard 
material. Holmes adds that the system also pointed 
out several untested polymers of boron, beryllium, 
or carbon doped with small amounts of hydrogen. 
The “Creativity Machine” was licensed to a company 
to develop new ultra-hard materials and high-tem-
perature superconductors.
Another recent very remarkable achievement is a 
robot-scientist, called ADAM (King et al. 2004), which 
conducted experiments on yeast using AI techniques. 
The goal of these experiments was to determine the 
function of several gene knockouts by varying the 
quantities of nutrient provided to the yeast. The robot 
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used a machine learning technique known as induc-
tive logic programming to select those experiments 
that could discriminate between different hypothe-
ses. Feedback on each experiment was provided by 
data reporting yeast survival or death. The most ac-
curate robot strategy outperformed humans doing 
the same task. Stephen Muggleton, one of the desig-
ners of ADAM, predicts the development of the first 
micro-fluidic robot scientist within the next years. A 
micro-fluidic robot scientist, according to Muggleton 
(2006), will combine active learning and autonomous 
experimentation with micro-fluidic technology (Flet-
cher et al., 2001). He argues that nowadays scientists 
can already build miniaturized laboratories on a chip 
using micro-fluidics and since these chips can perform 
chemical synthesis and testing at high speed, one can 
imagine miniaturizing the robot-scientist technology 
with the goal of reducing the experimental cycle time 
from hours to milliseconds. Furthermore, Muggleton 
speculates that more flexibility could be added to the 
micro-fluidic machines by developing what he calls a 
“Chemical Turing Machine”. The Chemical Turing Ma-
chine, according to Muggleton, would be “a univer-
sal processor capable of performing a broad range of 
chemical operations on both the reagents available to 
it at the start and those chemicals it later generates. 
The machine would automatically prepare and test 
chemical compounds but it would also be program-
mable, thus allowing much the same flexibility as a 
real chemist has in the lab.” 
Similarly to a standard Turing Machine, an automa-
ton, introduced by Alan Turing to give a mathematica-
lly precise definition of algorithm (Turing, 1936, 1938), 
which consisted of an infinite tape and a set of very 
simple rules for moving the tape and manipulating 
the symbols that contains, a Chemical Turing Machine 
would be an automaton connected to a conveyor belt 
containing a series of flasks: the chemical Turing ma-
chine can move the conveyor to obtain distant flasks, 
and can mix and make tests on local flasks.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: APPARENTLY OR REALLY 
CREATIVE?
Margaret Boden pointed out that even if an arti-
ficially intelligent computer would be as creative as 
Bach or Einstein, for many it would be just apparently 
creative but not really creative. I fully agree with her 
in the two main reasons for such rejection. These rea-
sons are: the lack of intentionality and our reluctance 
to give a place in our society to artificially intelligent 
agents. The lack of intentionality is a direct conse-
quence of Searle’s Chinese room argument (Searle, 
1980), which states that computer programs can only 
perform syntactic manipulation of symbols but are 
unable to give them any semantics. This criticism is 
based on an erroneous concept of what a computer 
program is. Indeed, a computer program does not 
only manipulate symbols but also triggers a chain of 
cause-effect relations inside the computer hardware 
and this fact is relevant for intentionality since it is ge-
nerally admitted that intentionality can be explained 
in terms of causal relations. However, it is also true 
that existing computer programs lack too many rele-
vant causal connections to exhibit intentionality, but 
perhaps future, possibly anthropomorphic, “embo-
died” artificial intelligences --that is agents equipped 
not only with sophisticated software but also with 
different types of advanced sensors allowing to inte-
ract with the environment-- may have sufficient causal 
connections to exhibit intentionality.
Regarding social rejection, the reasons why we are 
so reluctant to accept that non biological agents can 
be creative (even biological ones as it is the case with 
“Nonja”, a 20 years old painter from Vienna whose 
abstract paintings had been exhibited and apprecia-
ted in art galleries but that after knowing that she 
was an orang-utan from the Vienna Zoo, her work 
was much less appreciated!) is that they do not have 
a natural place in our society of human beings and a 
decision to accept them would have important social 
implications. It is therefore much simpler to say that 
they appear to be intelligent, creative, etc. instead of 
saying that they are. In a word, it is a moral but not a 
scientific issue. A third reason for denying creativity 
to computer programs is that they are not conscious 
of their accomplishments. However I agree with many 
AI scientists in thinking that the lack of consciousness 
is not a fundamental reason to deny the potential for 
creativity or even the potential for intelligence. After 
all, computers would not be the first example of un-
conscious creators, evolution is the first example as 
Stephen Jay Gould (1996) brilliantly points out: “If 
creation demands a visionary creator, then how does 
blind evolution manage to build such splendid new 
things as ourselves?”
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